Risk prediction in the practice of medical genetics is probabilistic and not absolute. The complexity of risk predictions is increased by the complexity of systems biology and an incomplete understanding of genetic and environmental modifiers. Genotype does not predict phenotype even for rare "single" gene or "simple" Mendelian disorders. The challenges facing risk assessment in the medical context includes our lack of understanding of the complexity of common, complex disorders, the influence of genetic and environmental effects in pharmacogenetics, and the difficulty of whole genome approaches. The inability to give absolutes to our patients means that often we are giving probabilities to our patients. This article discusses how risk predictions in the genetics context are compounded by complexity in and an incomplete understanding of systems biology.

Technology law is generally studied within discrete doctrinal boxes such as copyright law. Do we need a general theory of law and technology that could inform traditional doctrinal analysis? This Article explores how a synthetic theory of law and technology could help with legal analysis at the intersection of law and technology. The theory is "synthetic" as it represents a synthesis of two general theoretical strands of technology: instrumental theories and substantive theories. Generally speaking, instrumental theories tend to treat technology as a neutral tool without examining its broader social/cultural/political impact. In contrast, substantive theories emphasize the ways that technological systems can exert "control" over individuals, often without their knowledge that this process is taking place. A synthesis is necessary because each theory, standing alone, has disadvantages that reduce its utility with respect to legal analysis. The synthetic theory could serve as the basis for a fuller exploration of the ways that law can address challenges presented by changing technologies and promote conversations among lawyers and scholars who toil in seemingly disparate areas of technology law.

Current controversy exists over the extent to which upstream research tools should be patentable. There is a fear that overbroad biomedical research patents will cause upstream "clogging" that deters downstream invention of vital therapeutic products. In In re Fisher the court addressed this issue by applying the standard of usefulness required for patentable inventions under 35 U.S.C. § 101 to ESTs, finding that they were unpatentable because they lacked the requisite specific and substantial utility. The Fisher analysis reveals that the current test for utility requires revision because it fails to address the importance of research tools in modern biomedical research and poorly addresses the goals of the patent system. A new test should be adopted which alters the substantiality prong of the test in its application to research tools by allowing a research use in a laboratory setting to constitute a "real world" utility that is substantial. Such an altered utility test, when combined with narrow patent scope for research tools and reasonable licensing schemes, would recognize the significance of research tools in modern biomedical research by adequately rewarding inventors while promoting the "Progress of Science" as required by the Constitution.